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No patient who recovers
without a physician can
logically attribute his recovery
to spontaneity. Indeed, under
a close examination
spontaneity disappears. For
everything that occurs will be
found to do so through
something, and this ‘through
something’ shows that
spontaneity is a mere name
and has no reality. Medicine,
however, because it acts
‘through something’ and
because its results may be
forecasted, has reality.a
a Hippocrates, The Art, cited
in S. Sambursky, Physics of the
Stoics (Routledge and Keegan
Paul, London, 1987) pp. 51–52.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this note I consider time travel both as a real physical possibility
and as a means of re-examining fundamental assumptions about time.
Though stemming from a new mathematical model of the evolutionary
equations of physics, the arguments in this note are robust enough to
be stated with the technicalities only in the background. Such a style
of exposition also seems desirable in view of the widespread interest in
time-travel.
1.1. Background
Thorne and his consortium have proposed1 time machines based on
‘wormhole’ solutions, exploiting the fact that the Hilbert-Einstein equa-
tions are silent about the (algebraic) topology of spacetime. While
the ‘wormhole’ solutions involve ‘exotic matter’—matter with negative
mass and positively amusing properties2—Gott3 has shown that closed
timelike curves (CTCs) may also arise with cosmic strings. On the other
hand, Hawking4 has argued that there is excellent empirical evidence
for chronology protection since we have not been invaded by hordes of
tourists from the future.
1.2. Two Kinds of Time-Travel
For the purposes of this note it helps to make an informal distinction
between two types of time travel: (i) with time-machines and (ii) with-
out machines. An example of the second kind of time travel is transfer of
information using a retarded interaction going forward in time and an
advanced interaction returning backward in time.5 Access to advanced
interactions6 is possible under the hypothesis of a microphysical tilt in
the arrow of time.7 Strictly speaking, a ‘tilt’ does not involve any new
hypothesis; the usual hypothesis of ‘causality’ is rejected, so that the
evolution of a many-particle system is governed by a different category
of (mixed-type functional differential) equations of motion.
Time travel of the second kind contemplates only transfer of in-
formation without involving physical transport of the traveler’s body.
Nevertheless, some (diminished) kind of intervention in the past is
possible, in principle, because information may be transferred from
present to past using advanced interactions, though the bandwidth is
a very small fraction of the bandwidth for information transfer to the
future using retarded interactions.
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1.3. Aim
The aim of this note is to stand on its head the standard conclusion
derived from the paradoxes of time travel,8 especially for the case of
time travel without machines.
2. THE PARADOXES OF TIME TRAVEL
2.1. The Grandfather Paradox
The grandfather paradox is well-known:9 Tim travels into the past to
kill his grandfather when Grandfather was yet a boy; but that would
mean that Tim could not have been born and so could not have killed
Grandfather. The generally accepted conclusion is as follows. Since Tim
did not kill Grandfather in the ‘original’ 1921, consistency demands
that neither does he kill Grandfather in the ‘new’ 1921. The time
traveler must be prepared for unexpected constraints; Tim must fail
in the enterprise of killing Grandfather for some commonplace reason.
Perhaps some noise distracts him at the last moment, perhaps he misses
despite much target practice, perhaps even Tim killed Grandfather only
to discover his true antecedents! As summarised by Woodward,10 ‘Time
travel makes “free will” irrelevant’.
2.2. Mundane Time
One could elaborate the paradox as follows. Mundane time has a structure11
which is past linear and future branching (Fig. 1). If one bends it around
in a circle and joins future to past then either future branching or past
linearity must fail, so that one obtains the supercyclic time of Fig. 2.
2.3. Popper’s Record Postulate
Why not give up past linearity? This could be problematic, since the
significance of experimental records would then diminish, for an exper-
imental record could not, then, claim to represent the past. Popper12
proposed a record postulate, the ‘principle of the unbroken connection
of world lines’ which he formulated in operational terms as follows.
Any ‘observer’ (local material system) can begin, at any instant,
a record (causal trace); make successive entries into that record;
and arrange for the preservation of the record for any desired finite
period of time. (By ‘can’ the following is meant; the theoretical
possibility of any world-line, to be considered as consistent with the
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Figure 1. Mundane time: In everyday life, one philosophizes about the past but
agonizes about the future on the belief that one’s actions partly decide the future,
but leave the past unaffected.
laws of nature, must not entail the impossibility of the operations
described in the above principle.)
World lines closed in time now lead to a contradiction, since, for
consistency, the closed world line ‘must be infinitely and absolutely
repetitive,’ and hence ‘would entail periodic destruction of every single
record,’ since otherwise the record ‘would not be fully repetitive but
would constantly enrich itself upon every renewal of the closed journey.’
2.4. The Chronology Condition
Appeal to the future branching alone is also adequate. ‘The same result
may be obtained, even less ad hoc,’ continues Popper, ‘by adopting
a “principle of indeterminism”; this too would automatically exclude
all cosmological solutions permitting closed world-lines.’ Hawking and
Ellis13 similarly argue that future branching cannot be lightly rejected,
since ‘all of our philosophy of science is based on the assumption
that one is free to perform any experiment.’ Hence, they are ‘much
more ready to believe’ their chronology condition, viz. that there are
no CTCs. (Hawking’s latest position, marks a retreat from postulate
to conjecture, and adds the bit about making the universe safe for
historians.)
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Figure 2. Supercyclic time: All instants of time are arranged in a closed cycle, so
that any instant ‘precedes’ any other. Such a situation cannot be readily described
with the binary earlier-later relation implicit in the tense-structure of Indo-European
languages.
2.5. The Paradoxes Re-examined
In brief, the informed consensus favours the standard conclusion14 that
time travel is antithetical to spontaneity or ‘free will’. I will argue that
the exact opposite is true.
Let us re-examine the grandfather paradox, for two of its key fea-
tures seem to have gone unnoticed. We need to shift our attention
from the death of Grandfather to the birth of Tim, that is to the first
appearance of Tim in this world. Let us suppose that Tim’s ‘birth’ (i.e.
his chronologically earliest appearance in the world) was earlier than
his biological birth from his mother’s womb. Let us further suppose
that the event of Tim’s ‘birth’ did not go unobserved. Say, Tim’s house
had earlier been occupied by an eccentric scientist, who had called
another half-a-dozen scientists for tea. Tim, being a tyro at time travel,
appeared bang in the midst of this tea party. The scientists, true to their
profession, merely observed and theorised: they did not hop around or
interfere in what they took to be a demonstration to challenge their
theoretical capabilities, specially arranged by their eccentric host (who
had disappeared into the kitchen). Naturally, they were all blase enough
to regard it as a magic trick in bad taste. (Tim materialised with one
foot on a saucer, and spilled tea on a guest.)
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But we know better. We know that, however hard they might have
tried, the scientists could not have found an explanation for the fact
which was presented to them on a platter—no causal explanation that
is. We know that Tim’s appearance at the eccentric tea party really
had nothing to do with anything prior to the tea party; it was causally
inexplicable, spontaneous, so to say. The event of Tim’s birth could be
explained only with reference to the future.
2.6. Popper’s Pond
In the non-mechanical mode of time-travel, involving advanced inter-
actions, Tim’s ‘birth’ corresponds exactly to Popper’s pond paradox. If
a stone is dropped into a pond, ripples usually spread outwards (corre-
sponding to a retarded wave). In the advanced case, the ripples converge
spontaneously and throw the stone out of the pond. This sort of thing,
though possible according to physical theory, is not usually observed
unless one has filmed the sequence and plays the film backwards. But,
says Popper,15 ‘no physicist would mistake the end of the film for its
beginning; for the creation of a contracting circular wave followed by a
zone of undisturbed water would be (causally considered) miraculous.’
Popper’s own argument involved coherence: for constructive interfer-
ence of primary wavelets, to produce a converging ripple, by Huyghens’
principle, one would need coherence, and this would be practically
impossible to arrange without ‘organization from the centre’.
One can strengthen the first part of Popper’s argument, by giv-
ing more general and stronger arguments which show the theoretical
impossibility of explaining anticipatory phenomena from the past. A
causal explanation of anticipatory phenomena is mathematically im-
possible for exactly the same reason that a teleological explanation
of purely history dependent phenomena is mathematically impossible.
Purely anticipatory phenomena may be explained only by reference
to the future, just as history dependent phenomena may be explained
only by reference to the past, for the reasons sketched in Figs 3, 4, 5,
reproduced from Ref. 7, where they are explained in more detail. (A
quick exposition is also provided in the appendix to this note.)
The pond paradox is now seen to arise from Popper’s metaphysical
stipulation that all phenomena must admit a causal explanation, so
that phenomena not admitting a causal explanation cannot possibly oc-
cur. This position is reminiscent of the Stoics who derived heimarmene
(fate) from eiro (string beads), so that the evolution of the world was
analogous to moving beads on a necklace; the slightest spontaneous
swerve of the atoms (Epicurean clinamen) would break the string: ‘the
cosmos would break up and be shattered. . . if some uncaused movement
timtrpap_f1.tex; 31/10/2018; 17:30; p.8
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Figure 3. Three solutions of a retarded equation. The different past histories pre-
scribed over [−1, 0] all result in the same future for t ≥ 1. Retrodiction is hence
impossible from future data prescribed over t ≥ 1. Teleological explanations are
impossible, with history-dependent evolution.
Figure 4. Three solutions of an advanced equation: different futures over [1,2] cor-
respond to the same past for t ≤ 0. With anticipation past fails to decide the future,
for one past may correspond to many futures, in this time reverse of Fig. 3. Hence,
causal explanations are impossible with anticipatory evolution.
were to be introduced into it.16 Perhaps it is necessary to restate that a
metaphysical stipulation (‘everything must have an antecedent cause’),
as used e.g. by Hippocrates, may not be used to decide admissible
phenomena. The existence or non-existence of the spontaneous can only
be decided by observation.
2.7. The Empirical Evidence
The absence of hordes of tourists from the future is, therefore, no
evidence against time travel of the second kind. It would be enough
if we occasionally observe some spontaneous events.
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Figure 5. With a realistic mixture of history-dependence and a small amount of
anticipation, the past still fails to decide the future. With this model, all phenom-
ena do not admit causal explanations, so that spontaneity really is possible. The
existence of a small tilt is exactly the condition for time-travel of the second kind.
2.8. The Mechanization of Spontaneity
A key feature of spontaneity in the above sense is that spontaneity
cannot be mechanized, i.e., though time travel may be possible, timema-
chines are not: only time travel of the second kind is possible. Popper’s
conclusions from his pond paradox only need to be toned down: while
the existence of a causal explanation cannot very well be a precondition
for the occurrence of a phenomenon, without a causal explanation one
cannot systematically control the phenomenon, or arrange for it to
occur, or mechanically reproduce it. The Wellsian time-machine incor-
porates in its construction the intuitive idea of ‘control’ from the future.
In the physics literature, the same idea was articulated in the context
of the tachyonic anti-telephone: if Shakespeare used a tachyonic anti-
telephone to dictate Hamlet to Bacon then, Benford et al.17 argued,
while Bacon would have chronological priority, Shakespeare remained
the author of Hamlet—since Shakespeare was the one who had ‘control’.
But, in a situation where interactions may propagate from future to
past, it is not clear that control from the future is any more possible
than control from the past, and Fig. 5 sketches a counter-example:
in some situations prescribing both past and future data may still
be inadequate to determine a unique present. Similarly, the classical
argument18 to exorcise Maxwell’s demon excludes only the mechanical
form of the demon, which could lead to a controllable, hence possibly
unboundedly large, decrease of entropy.
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Figure 6. The figure shows some Brownian sample paths. The sample paths mix:
the trajectories tend to ‘forget’ their past and asymptotically become statistically
independent of it, unlike the background vector field (dashed lines) which corre-
sponds to solutions of the unperturbed ordinary differential equation. ‘Mixing’ due
to chance is believed to produce entropy rather than order (= negentropy).
2.9. Spontaneity and Chance
The relevance of Maxwell’s demon is the following. Spontaneity, in the
sense proposed above, differs from the notion of ‘chance’ in the sense
of probabilistic (‘stochastic’) evolution, such as that of a stochastic
process, where the probabilities of future states can be computed once
the past states are known. (The meaning we have assigned to ‘chance’
is related to contemporary customary usage amongst physicists: for
the last hundred years or so, it has been argued that probabilistic
evolution accounts for entropy increase within classical reversible dy-
namics.) Mathematically, the difference is that evolution involving such
‘chance’ may be modeled by stochastic differential equations (Fig.6),
categorically distinct from the mixed-type functional differential equa-
tions which model evolution involving a tilt in the arrow of time. In
physical terms, a key difference is that chance corresponds to ‘mixing’
while spontaneity, in the above sense, corresponds to ‘sorting’.
That is, if the implicit assumption of some kind of ‘mixing’ or quasi-
ergodicity is acceptable as a characteristic feature of ‘chance’ in the
sense of probabilistic evolution, one might say that ‘chance’ results in
an increase of entropy, whereas spontaneity in the above sense (e.g.
a converging ripple) clearly corresponds to a reduction in entropy, or
to the creation of order. So, time travel of the second kind actually
corresponds to spontaneous order creation.
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Though general relativistic statistical mechanics (and the statistical
basis of the stress-energy continuum) is problematic, the apparently
necessary association of exotic matter (hence negative energies) with
wormhole spacetimes suggests, in the standard MTW19 approach to rel-
ativistic thermodynamics, that, one should expect a similar association
of entropy reduction with time travel in the case of wormholes.
It is natural to conjecture that any macrophysical manifestation of
spontaneity would involve, in an essential way, the one thing that has
remarkably resisted mechanization: life. Specifically, I expect that a
systematic microphysical tilt in the arrow of time would show up in
the structure and dynamics of biological macromolecules. At present,
solutions of the many-particle equations of motion with a microphysical
tilt in the arrow of time are still being simulated, and compared with
solutions of a stochastically perturbed form of the classical equations,
and only preliminary results are available,20, 21 so that it would not
be in order to make a more definite statement. However, some gen-
eral arguments connecting spontaneity in the above sense with ‘human
freedom’ in the mundane sense of Fig. 1 may be found in Ref. 7.
At the microphysical level, spontaneity as a necessary correlate of
non-locality is especially interesting in the context (Ref. 7) of the
structured-time interpretation of quantum mechanics.
3. CONCLUSIONS
Time travel conflicts not with choice but with ‘causality’: if two-way
interaction with the future is permitted, one can no longer hang on to
‘causality’ in the sense of demanding explanations exclusively from the
past. Interactions propagating from future to present imply the occur-
rence of events that are causally inexplicable. Under the circumstances
of time travel, one must allow for the reality of such spontaneous events,
which differ from ‘chance’ events in creating order instead of destroying
it. The mechanization of spontaneity, however, is impossible, so that
time travel can only be of the second kind.
Appendix
A causal explanation of anticipatory phenomena is mathematically im-
possible: following the referee’s suggestion to keep the paper self-contained,
we reproduce here from Ref. 7, some mathematical details of the argu-
ment.
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First, let us see why a teleological explanation of history-dependent
phenomena is mathematically impossible. Fig. 3 shows three solutions
of the retarded FDE
x′(t) = b(t)x(t− 1), (1)
where b is a continuous function which vanishes outside [0, 1], and
satisfies
∫
b(t) dt = −1. (2)
For example,
b(t) =


0 : t ≤ 0
−1 + cos 2pit : 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
0 : t ≥ 1
(3)
For t ≤ 0, the FDE (1) reduces to the ODE x′(t) = 0 , so that, for
t ≤ 0, x(t) = k for some constant k (= x(0)).
Now, for t ∈ [0, 1],
x(t) = x(0) +
∫ t
0
x′(s)ds
= x(0) +
∫ t
0
b(s)x(s− 1)ds
= x(0) + x(0)
∫ t
0
b(s)ds, (4)
since x(s − 1) ≡ k = x(0) for s ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, using (2), x(1) = 0,
no matter what k was. However, since b(t) = 0 for t ≥ 1, the FDE (1)
again reduces to the ODE x′(t) = 0, for t ≥ 1, so that x(1) = 0 implies
x(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 1. Hence, the past of a system governed by (1)
cannot be retrodicted from a knowledge of the entire future; for if the
future data (i.e., values of the function for all future times t ≥ 1) are
prescribed using a function φ that is different from 0 on [1, ∞], then (1)
admits no backward solutions for t ≤ 1. If, on the other hand, φ ≡ 0
on [1, ∞], then there are an infinity of distinct backward solutions.
In either case, knowledge of the entire future furnishes no information
about the past.
The actual solutions shown in the graph were obtained numerically,
using the retard package of Hairer et al.22
In the advanced case, as suggested by Fig. 4, the argument is the
time-symmetric counterpart of the above argument. In this case, the
equation solved was the analogous advanced FDE
x′(t) = b(t)x(t+ 1), (5)
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where the function b has the same properties as before, except that
∫
b(t)dt = 1. (6)
For example,
b(t) =


0 : t ≤ 0
1− cos 2pit : 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
0 : t ≥ 1
(7)
The reasoning proceeds in an entirely analogous manner. For t ≥ 1,
the FDE (5) reduces to the ODE x′(t) = 0, so that, for t ≥ 1, x(t) = k
for some constant k (= x(1)).
Now, for t ∈ [0, 1],
x(t) = x(1)−
∫ 1
t
x′(s)ds
= x(1)−
∫ 1
t
b(s)x(s+ 1)ds
= x(1)− x(1)
∫ 1
t
b(s)ds, (8)
since x(s + 1) ≡ k = x(1) for s ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, using (6), x(0) = 0,
no matter what k was. However, since b(t) = 0 for t ≤ 0, the FDE
(5) again reduces to the ODE x′(t) = 0, for t ≤ 0, so that x(0) = 0
implies x(t) = 0 for all t ≤ 1. Hence, the future of a system governed
by (5) cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the entire past; for if
the past data (i.e., values of the function for all past times t ≤ 0) are
prescribed using a function φ that is different from 0 on [−∞, 0], then
(5) admits no forward solutions. If, on the other hand, φ ≡ 0 on [−∞, 0],
then there are an infinity of distinct forward solutions. In either case,
precise knowledge of the entire past furnishes no information about
the future. The actual numerical solutions shown were obtained by a
time-symmetric modification of the retard package.
Fig. 5 shows solutions of the mixed-type equation
x′(t) = a(t)x(t− 1) + b(t)x(t+ 1), (9)
where b has the same properties as in (6), and the continuous function
a now has support on the interval [2, 3], and satisfies
∫ 3
2
a(t)dt = −1. (10)
The solutions may be obtained by combining the reasoning used in the
preceding two cases.
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Physically, retarded FDE arise as the equations of motion of charged
particles, using the Heaviside-Lorentz force law, and assuming fully re-
tarded Lienard-Wiechert potentials.7, 20, 21 Mixed-type equations arise
as the equations of motion of charged particles in the case where most
electromagnetic radiation is retarded, but some of it may be advanced,
i.e., we use a convex combination of retarded and advanced Lienard-
Wiechert potentials. This possibility has often been excluded on meta-
physical grounds, without studying the immediate empirical conse-
quence (of spontaneity), here and now, of this assumption.
Finally, in the case of Fig. 6 the equation solved was a stochastic
differential equation of the type
dXt = a(t, Xt)dt+ b(t, Xt)dw(t), (11)
where w(t) is the standard Brownian motion (Wiener process). The
background vector field relates to the deterministic part of this equa-
tion, obtained using only the drift function a(t, Xt) and setting the
dispersion function b(t, Xt) to zero. The sample paths shown in the
figure were obtained using this author’s package stochode for the
solution of stochastic differential equations (SDE’s) driven by Brownian
or Le´vy motion.
Given the vast difference between the mathematical theory under-
lying SDE’s (‘chance’) and that underlying mixed-type FDE’s (‘spon-
taneity’) it is surprising why it should be hard to discriminate between
the physical consequences of the two. In the case of SDE’s (‘chance’) the
future is epistemically uncertain since (a) the past is uncertain, and (b)
the relation of past to future is probabilistic rather than deterministic.
In the case of mixed-type FDE’s (‘spontaneity’), the future is ontically
uncertain, regardless of knowledge of the past, because past does not
entirely determine the future
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